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HOMELESS AND WITHOUT WHEELS": CORPORATE
FRAUD, EQUITABLE REMEDIES, AND THE DEBATE
OVER ENTITY VERSUS INDIVIDUAL LIABILITY
Donald C. Langevoort*

Former SEC Chairman Richard Breeden once famously
threatened that his agency would pursue wrongdoing corporate
executives so as to leave them "naked, homeless and without
wheels."l Yet it has not always been so clear that executives are the
primary focus of securities enforcement in financial misreporting
cases, even when they are its main architects. Their companies
often seem to be the real targets. In reports about private securities
litigation, settlements (and the rare judgments after trial) in fraud-

* Thomas Aquinas Reynolds Professor of Law, Georgetown University
Law Center. Thanks to Bill Bratton, Hillary Sale, Larry Hamermesh, Donna
Nagy, Mark Kreitman, and faculty and students in presentations at
Georgetown, Fordham, and the University of Connecticut Insurance Law
Symposium for helpful comments; to David Becker for helping me with the title
quote; and to Aslynn Johnson and John Huffman for excellent research
assistance.
1. Meyer Eisenberg, Enforcement Issues and Litigation, 21 SEC. REG. L.J.
421, 421-22 (1994).
The reference was to pursuing insider traders,
but has taken on a broader connotation in SEC lore. See id.; SEC. &
EXCH.
COMM'N,
ROUNDTABLE
OF
SEC
CHAIRMEN
12-13
(2004),
http://www.sechistorical.org/collection/oralHistories/roundtables/SECChairmen/
chairmen_060204Transcript. pdf.
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on-the-market lawsuits are almost always paid directly by the
company or out of its directors' and officers' ("D&O") insurance
coverage, for which the company pays the premiums, rather than by
2
the officers or directors charged with the fraud.
In SEC
enforcement actions, headlines frequently tell about the heavy civil
penalties imposed on issuers.
To be sure, there have been
noteworthy criminal prosecutions of individual executives 3 and wellpublicized individual settlements in a few private class actions. 4
Since 2002 especially, the SEC has clearly been more aggressive in
seeking remedies against individual executives, and even companies
themselves appear more willing to try to recoup payments they have
made to dishonest managers. 5 But it is still too early to say whether
there really has been a shift in emphasis, much less a coherent
policy behind the "company versus individuals" decision when
sanctioning corporate fraud. 6
To academics, the appropriate role of enterprise liability in
securities litigation is hardly a new issue-it has been debated at

2. For a now somewhat-dated study, see FREDERICK C. DUNBAR ET AL.,
NERA REPORT-RECENT TRENDS III: WHAT EXPLAINS SETTLEMENTS IN
SECURITIES CLASS ACTIONS? 9 (1995) (concluding that 68.2% of settlements are
paid from insurers, 31.4% from the company, and only 0.4% from individual
defendants). There have been some recent cases with large contributions by
major company executives (often controlling shareholders), but these seem to be
limited to situations where the company is insolvent and the insider is under
indictment, so that contributing to the settlement fund may largely be an effort
to gain leniency. See John C. Coffee, Reforming the Securities Class Action: An
Essay on Deterrence and its Implementation, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1534,1551-53
(2006). A good example of the standard practice is the Cendant litigation,
which prior to Enron and Worldcom was the largest securities fraud settlement.
In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 264 F.3d 286 (3d Cir. 2001). The company paid
$2.85 billion of the $3.18 billion settlement, with no individual contribution. Id.
at 288. An attack on the fairness of the settlement was rejected. Id. at 292293; see Coffee, supra, at 1568.
3. See Kathleen Brickey, In Enron's Wake: Corporate Executives on Trial,
96 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 397,420-33 (2006).
4. See Coffee, supra note 2, at 1551.
5. These efforts are difficult, however. See Phred Dvorak & Serena Ng,
Check, Please: Reclaiming Pay from Executives is Tough to Do, WALL ST. J., Nov.
20, 2006, at AI; Joann Lublin & Scott Thurm, How to Fire a CEO: More Bosses
Are Getting the Boot, But It's Harder to Sack Them Without Paying for the
Privilege, WALL ST. J., Oct. 30, 2006, at Bl, B3.
6. A study by Karpoff, Lee, and Martin indicates that from a review of
cases brought from 1978 to 2006, some $1.8 billion in fines was assessed against
senior executives in financial misreporting cases, along with some $8.64 billion
in disgorgement. Jonathan M. Karpoff et aI., The Consequences to Managers for
Financial Misrepresentation, J. FIN. ECON. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 32,
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/soI3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=972607).This
shows a considerable targeting of individuals, but probably nowhere near the
level of aggregate gain from such misconduct. Individual executives also suffer
in other ways, including a high probability of job loss and drop in stock value of
their securities holdings.
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length for some time. 7 What is most notable is how many scholars
from across the ideological spectrum have now joined the doubters of
enterprise liability, at least with respect to private securities
s
litigation. For some time, critics of private securities litigation were
concerned almost exclusively with the potential for strike suits,
painting class actions as a form of plaintiffs' lawyer-driven
extortion, regardless of at whom they were targeted. 9
That
argument, though expressing a legitimate concern,1O was probably
overstated, and the reforms proposed as a result of it threatened
good private lawsuits as well as bad ones.ll But this debate
obscured deeper questions of whether and how much investors
really benefit, even from meritorious cases, given how the litigation
system is currently structured. Much of this relates to the centrality
of enterprise liability, which effectively causes some investors to
shoulder the lawsuits' burdens while others receive payouts. The
SEC, too, has shifted with respect to its enforcement actions,
recently acknowledging that the justification for enterprise liability
in the form of civil penalties against corporate defendants is not selfevident, and thus adopting a new policy for deciding whether the
company itself will be penalized at all. 12
7. See Janet Cooper Alexander, Rethinking Damages in Securities Class
Actions, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1487, 1504 (1996); Jennifer Arlen & William Carney,
Vicarious Liability for Fraud on Securities Markets: Theories and Evidence,
1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 691,692 (1992); Donald C. Langevoort, Capping Damages
for Open Market Securities Fraud, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 639, 653-57 (1996); Adam
Pritchard, Markets as Monitors: A Proposal to Replace Class Actions with
Exchanges as Securities Fraud Enforcers, 85 VA. L. REV. 925, 947-59 (1999).
The issue is, of course, important beyond securities litigation. E.g., Alan Sykes,
The Economics of Vicarious Liability, 93 YALE L.J. 1231, 1278-80 (1984).
8. For the most recent contributions to the literature, see Coffee, supra
note 2, at 1561-66; Larry Ribstein, Fraud on a Noisy Market, 10 LEWIS &
CLARK L. REV. 137, 143-47 (2006); Richard Booth, Who Should Recover What
for Securities Fraud? 30 (Univ. Md. School of Law Legal Studies
Research Paper Series, Paper No. 2005-32, 2005), available at
http://www.ssrn.comlabstract=683197 .
9. See Stephen J. Choi & Robert B. Thompson, Securities Litigation and
Its Lawyers: Changes During the First Decade After the PSLRA, 106 COLUM. L.
REV. 1489, 1490-93 (2006); see also Coffee, supra note 2, at 1536 n.5.
10. For a good overview of the evidence, see Choi & Thompson, supra note
9, at 1490-93; Stephen J. Choi, The Evidence on Securities Class Actions, 57
VAND. L. REV. 1465, 1469-74 (2004).
11. See, e.g., James D. Cox, Making Securities Fraud Class Actions
Virtuous, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 497, 523-24 (1997); Elliot Weiss & Janet Moser,
Enter Yossarian: How to Resolve the Procedural Catch·22 that the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act Creates, 76 WASH. U. L.Q. 457,458-60 (1998).
Many commentators who believe that securities fraud requires aggressive
deterrence were thus led to oppose reform.
12. Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Statement of the Securities and
Exchange Commission Concerning Financial Penalties (Jan. 4, 2006),
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2006-4.htm [hereinafter SEC Statementl. The
debate also occurs in the criminal context, where many have discussed whether
corporate criminal liability: plays a useful role. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, No
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All of this is interesting and important, though background for
my main interest in this Article. To the extent that we were to shift
away from our current emphasis on corporate liability, are we
satisfied with the available tools for going after the executives who
were complicit in the fraud? After all, enterprise liability evolved as
a solution to the problems associated with sanctioning individuals.
Now that we have more doubts about the efficacy of that solution,
we should revisit the law and theory of individual liability to see if
there are changes we should make there.
My view is that enterprise liability can and should be pared
back, but that the legitimacy of the underlying policy requires that
we see to it that executives who are responsible for corporate fraud
or misreporting at the very least forfeit most or all of the immense
wealth obtained as a result of their control over the firm during the
time of the wrongdoing. Hence, my attention in this Article is on
equitable remedies-especially rescission and restitution-as
underutilized tools in securities fraud enforcement. As we shall see,
equitable remedies have the appeal (from the plaintiffs or enforcer's
perspective, at least) of making a culpable state of mind-i.e.,
scienter-far less important, thereby easing what is almost always
the moving party's heaviest evidentiary burden. When there is real
culpability, a predictable penalty on top of that as a deterrent would
be good, too, although we must be wary of being too punitive with
respect to managers who acted in good faith in trying to benefit the
company and its shareholders .. The line between fraud and savvy
competitive behavior (or poor judgment) is a blurry one in a business
13
world hardly characterized by confessional candor.
This Article
takes inventory of current law to see how close to the restitutionary
objective we are and what changes might be helpful.
Dishonest executives are undoubtedly subject to serious
sanction; the question is only how and by whom those executives are
sanctioned. There are many potential sources of sanction: federal
and state, civil and criminal, private and public, or legal and extralegal. 14 Even just a survey of these possibilities would be lengthy,
and that is not the goal of my Article. Instead, I focus on comparing
and contrasting two main sources of equitable remedies. One is
federal securities regulation, via both private and public
enforcement. As to SEC enforcement, the question is less one of law
than of will and resources, which leads naturally to the role of
private lawsuits against officers and other executives as a

Soul to Damn, No Body to Kick: An Unscandalized Inquiry into the Problem of
Corporate Punishment, 79 MICH. L. REV. 386, 434-48 (1981).
13. See Donald C. Langevoort, Technological Innovation and the Devolution
of Corporate Financial Reporting, 46 WM. & MARy L. REV. 1,31-32 (2004); see
also infra note 51 and accompanying text.
14. On nonlegal sanctions, see Karpoff, supra note 6, at 32; see also infra
note 42 and accompanying text.
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supplement to the SEC. Here, the problem of executive liability is
quite interesting and problematic along a number of dimensions.
The other main source of equitable remedies is state law,
particularly in Delaware, the leading state of incorporation for large
firms. It may seem obvious that dishonesty is a form of breach of
fiduciary duty and that riches tainted by the wrongdoing should
readily be disgorged under state law. But what if executive
compensation contracts are written in such a way as to limit the
circumstances in which the executive can be terminated "for cause"
and is required to forfeit compensation?15 Or what if the board of
directors decides, as a matter of business judgment, to settle with
the executive in a way that seemingly leaves substantial "ill-gotten"
wealth in the executive's possession? I only want to evaluate the
state of the law here, and also suggest that how Delaware law
eventually answers these questions says something about whether
and how federal law should be redesigned.
I.

BACKGROUND: ENTERPRISE LIABILITY UNDER FEDERAL LAW

There are, of course, many different forms of executive
misconduct-commonly, they fall into the categories of breaches of
care, loyalty, and candor, and may be characterized by various
states of mind, from malice to simple negligence. Obviously, fraud
(i.e., intentional or reckless deception) is the most notorious form of
misconduct. Although fraud fits easily enough into the duty of
candor category at state law/6 most of the litigation about fraud
17
takes place in federal court under the federal securities laws.
There are many reasons for this bias toward federal litigation,
18
but the strong embrace of enterprise liability at the federallevel is
surely a significant factor. Although there are interesting questions
beyond the scope of this paper about how well the doctrine of
respondeat superior fits with the text and structure of the securities
laws' principal antifraud provision, Rule 10b_5,19 courts have largely
assumed that when an executive speaks or acts fraudulently within
the scope of his or her authority and in a manner at least partially
meant to benefit the corporation, the corporation is jointly and
20
severally liable.
Thus, both private plaintiffs and the SEC
15. See David Leonhardt, Watch It: If You Cheat, They'll Throw Money,
N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 2002, at Bl.
16. See Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5,11 (Del. 1998).
17. See Robert Thompson & Hillary Sale, Securities Fraud as Corporate
Governance: Reflections on Federalism, 56 VAND. L. REV. 859,909-10 (2003).
18. Id. at 864.
19. See generally Robert A. Prentice, Conceiving the Inconceivable and
Judicially Implementing the Preposterous: The Premature Demise of Respondeat
Superior Liability Under Section 1O(b), 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 1325, 1326-32 (1997).
20. The more difficult question tends to be whether the corporation is liable
for fraud when the person responsible for the misstatement was not aware of
the truth but some other corporate employee was, or-even harder-when no
HeinOnline -- 42 Wake Forest L. Rev. 631 2007
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commonly name both the company and the potentially responsible
executives and directors as defendants.
The controversy is that any financial sanction that is imposed
on the corporation in a respondeat superior environment is borne in
the first instance by the company shareholders, whom we generally
think of as victims, not wrongdoers. This double victimization is not
inevitably so. There are many cases, such as when fraud permits
the company to acquire another with overvalued assets, where
shareholde:-s are clear beneficiaries of the fraud. However, financial
misreporting usually has at least a partial element of greed or
foolishness to it so that the shareholder victimization label is often
apt, leading to concern about the fairness and efficiency of
enterprise liability.
The resulting debate focuses on both compensation and
deterrence. In private litigation, the result of a judgment or
settlement is that investors who bought or sold during the period of
the fraud will recover for the losses caused by the revelation of the
truth. 21 In situations where the company itself is not buying or
selling in the marketplace (as opposed, for example, to a Section 11
case for a registered public offering under the Securities Act or to
issuer repurchase activity),22 the investor's loss is not the company's
gain; instead, other investors pocket the gain. The other investor
might be an executive in on the conspiracy, making it essentially an
insider trading case, but it is much more likely that the
counterparty was simply someone lucky enough to be on the right
side of the trade. Scholars going back at least to Easterbrook and
Fischel's classic analysis 23 have pointed out that the net social harm
from corporate fraud, therefore, is much less than is evident at first
glance because of these offsetting gains to innocent parties, which
the law makes no effort to take away.24
That does not mean that the unfortunate victims do not deserve
compensation. However, if we assume that the company is forced to
pay that compensation, directly or via the insurance policy it has
purchased for its officers and directors, then the compensation is
single corporate employee knew the truth, but their collective knowledge would
have revealed it. See, e.g., Southland Sec. Corp. v. Inspire Ins. Solutions Inc.,
365 F.3d 353, 363-66 (5th Cir. 2004); Donald C. Langevoort, Agency Law Inside
the Corporation: Problems of Candor and Knowledge, 71 U. CrN. L. REV. 1187,
1226-30 (2003).
21. See Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 344 (2005) (analyzing
the loss causation element of Rule 10b-5 claims following the passage of the
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act).
22. See Langevoort, supra note 7, at 662-63; Booth, supra note 8, at 20.
23. Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Optimal Damages in
Securities Cases, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 611, 651-52 (1985); see also Dennis Karjala,
A Coherent Approach to Misleading Corporate Announcements, Fraud and Rule
lOb-5, 52 ALB. L. REV. 957, 963-64 (1988); Paul Mahoney, Precaution Costs and
the Law of Fraud in Impersonal Markets, 78 VA. L. REV. 623, 628-29 (1992).
24. Mahoney, supra note 23, at 646-48.
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largely a form of pocket shifting. 25 Investors find themselves either
payors or payees (and in some cases both), depending on when they
bought or sold the company's stock. Research has shown what
common sense suggests-that the filing of a class action lawsuit
against a company leads to a drop in the stock price of the company
separate and distinct from any news it conveys about the
wrongdoing. 26 Current shareholders understand that they will be
net losers as a result of the suit, both in terms of money paid out
and legal expenses incurred. 27
Pocket shifting notwithstanding, compensation still may be
good policy if the claims of harm are compelling enough. Pocket
shifting, after all, is the nature of insurance, and society might wish
to use enterprise liability as an insurance device for investors. Here
we come to a second point that many commentators have
emphasized. 28 On average, an investor has roughly the same
likelihood of being the lucky beneficiary of a fraud as its victim. 29
For diversified, active investors, the gains and losses will thus tend
to net out over time, meaning that the need for insurance for those
25. Obviously, this result leaves open the question of whether third
parties-e.g., accountants, lawyers, investment banks-should be subject to
suit, since there is less pocket shifting going on there and the case for
deterrence is stronger. I believe that issuer and third party liability issues
differ, though there is a case for capping damages in both situations. In
particular, leaving third parties open to the full measure of damages while
seeking to protect issuers raises the likelihood that, through indemnification
provisions or other risk-shifting techniques, the third-parties' liability will
indirectly be pushed back to the issuer.
26. See ANJAN THAKOR, U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, THE
UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF SECURITIES LITIGATION 5 (2005); Roberta
Romano, The Shareholder Suit: Litigation Without Foundation?, 7 J.L. ECON. &
ORG. 55, 67-68 (1991); see also Janet Cooper Alexander, The Value of Bad News
in Securities Class Actions, 41 UCLA L. REV. 1421, 1435 (1994). On investor
anticipation of such losses, see Amar Gande & Craig Lewis, Shareholder
Initiated Class Action Lawsuits: Shareholder Wealth Effects and Industry
Spillovers
5
(Working
Paper
Series,
2007),
available
at
http://www.ssm.com/abstract=891028.
Plenty of evidence supports the
inference that investors as a whole see restraints on private securities litigation
as useful, not threatening. See, e.g., Marilyn Johnson et aI., In re Silicon
Graphics, Inc.: Shareholder Wealth Effects Resulting from the Interpretation of
the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act's Pleading Standard, 73 S. CAL. L.
REV. 794 (2000); see also Joseph Grundfest & Adam Pritchard, Statutes with
Multiple Personality Disorders: The Value of Ambiguity in Statutory Design and
Interpretation, 54 STAN. L. REV. 627, 676-77 (2002).
27. See Johnson et aI., supra note 26, at 802; Gande & Lewis, supra note
26, at 10.
28. See Arlen & Carney, supra note 7, at 698-700; Langevoort, supra note
7, at 648-50; Mahoney, supra note 23, at 635. For an empirical demonstration,
see ANJAN V. THAKOR, U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, .THE ECONOMIC
REALITY OF SECURITIES CLASS ACTION LITIGATION 4 (2005), available at
http://downloads.heartland.orgl18331.pdf.
29. The difference reflects trading by the company itself or by insiders with
knowledge of the fraud.
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losses lessens. Moreover, if we assume a highly efficient market, the
residual risk will be priced ex ante,30 so that compensation for the
average amount of fraud would be built into stock prices. There is
less need for insurance then, especially if it comes-as it does-with
high premiums in the form of attorneys' fees and other litigation
costs borne by shareholders.
Still, not all investors are active or diversified, and bad luck as a
result of corporate fraud will predictably befall even some who are,
in ways that are not washed away. There will always be some
investors who did rely and suffered losses well in excess of any
compensation they got outside of litigation. Even here, however, we
should be cautious. Inactive investors are far more likely not to
have traded during the class period, but rather to be among those
company shareholders who simply suffer the costs of the lawsuit
(many investors who feel aggrieved when the revelation of fraud
causes a large stock price drop have no standing to sue because they
bought before the fraud).31 But in the end, therefore, we have to
admit that there will be some compelling cases where recovery, even
in an insurance-like system, seems warranted. In the Enron
litigation,32 for example, much was made of many current and
former company employees whose retirement savings were heavily
33
concentrated in Enron stock.
Their claim for just compensation
34
seems persuasive.
The question is whether, even for this
remaining group, the insurance "product" created by private
litigation-driven enterprise liability is a particularly attractive one.

30. I am skeptical that market prices decrease the risk of fraud in a careful
fashion, though there is no doubt that the risk premium does reflect, in part,
the fear of deception. See generally Donald C. Langevoort, The Animal Spiritsof the Stock Market: A Behavioral Approach to Securities Regulation, 97 Nw. U.
L. REV. 135, 182-83 (2002). My guess is that this varies widely based on
investor sentiment.
31. And it is quite possible that much of the public support for private
securities litigation comes as a result of the erroneous assumption that the law
does compensate all these victims. An interesting feature of the litigation
landscape is how often institutional investors do not even bother to collect the
money owed to them as a result of settlements, which says somethingalthough it is not clear exactly what-about how institutions view the need for
compensation. See James D. Cox & Randall Thomas, Letting Billions Slip
Through Your Fingers: Empirical Evidence and Legal Implications of the
Failure of Financial Institutions to Participate in Securities Class Action
Settlements, 58 STAN. L. REV. 411, 412-13 (2005).
32. See generally In re Enron Corp. Secs., Derivative & "ERISA" Litig., 284
F. Supp. 2d 511 (S.D. Tex. 2003) (denying in part a motion to dismiss claims
brought by participants in three employee pension plans under ERISA for a
breach of fiduciary duty against their employer).
33. Id. at 555-59.
34. One problem with this, however, is moral hazard: as a matter of policy,
investors should diversify and be careful-it thus seems counterintuitive to give
compensatory priority to those who are not. See David Hoffman, The "Duty" to
be a Rational Shareholder, 90 MINN. L. REV. 537, 548-49 (2005).
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It delivers at best only five to ten cents per dollar of alleged losses
(often less), compensates far too many investors who do not have the
same claim to compensation, and comes at a very high price tag that
eats up fifteen to thirty percent of the claims in plaintiffs' legal fees
and costs plus arguably even more in indirect costs (particularly
defendants' legal fees and costS).35 Were this sold as an insurance
product, consumer-protection advocates might well seek to have it
banned as abusive because the hidden costs are so large. Conceding
that some mechanism should exist to compensate these sufferers, it
is far from clear that the appropriate mechanism is the current
system.
The foregoing argument is commonly met with the response
that whatever its defects as a compensatory device, private
36
From a
securities litigation effectively deters securities fraud.
deterrence standpoint, enterprise liability is attractive because
37
responsibility for fraud is often diffused among many participants.
The threat of enterprise liability essentially instructs the firm to
take precautions (selection of managers, design of incentives,
internal controls, etc.) to reduce the system-wide fraud risk. It also
permits a more risk-neutral entity to assume this task, as opposed
to risk-fearing individual executives who might thus be excessively
38
.
caut lOUS.
The problem is that executives themselves will not be deterred
from misconduct when their personal gain from perpetrating or
concealing the fraud exceeds the impact they would suffer should
the corporation have to pay. As Arlen and Carney have shown, a
sizable portion of corporate fraud comes when executives fear that
discovery of the truth will cost them their jobs, reputations, and
perquisites, and thus have a strong incentive to delay discovery so
that they can remain in control longer and hope for some good
39
fortune that will turn things around. Even if much of this is also
intended to benefit the company (e.g., keeping creditors or
customers from exiting in a way that would harm the company or
even threaten its survival), the rational response is to take the risk
of some future lawsuit rather than bring on certain immediate
harm. Psychologically, the tendency of corporate executives (and
corporate cultures) to be overconfident about their chances of
avoiding harm only increases the likelihood of their misrepresenting
35. See generally In re WorldCom, Inc. Secs. Litig., 315 F. Supp. 2d 527,
538 (S.D. N.Y. 2004).
36. See Eric Helland, Reputational Penalties and the Merits of Class Action
Securities Litigation, 49 J.L. & ECON. 365, 365 (2006).
37. See Reinier Kraakman, Corporate Liability Strategies and the Costs of
Legal Controls, 93 YALE L.J. 857, 866-67 (1984).
38. See, e.g., A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Should Employees Be
Subject to Fines and Imprisonment Given the Existence of Corporate Liability?,
13 INTL REV. L. & ECON. 239 passim (1993).
39. Arlen & Carney, supra note 7, at 694.
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the truth. 40
An alternative deterrence story is that, while executives might
well be subject to temptation or cognitive bias, outside directors will
not, and they will insist on rigorous monitoring and internal controls
to avoid large-scale enterprise liability.41 There are two main
responses here. One is that the company clearly suffers from the
marketplace discovery of the fraud at a level substantially in excess
of even the most sizable fines. 42 If the directors are sufficiently
motivated, this reputational exposure (without the need for
additional legal penalty) would seem to be ample to put them to
work. 43 The other response is that the assumption of sufficiently
motivated and knowledgeable outside directors is questionable, at
least historically. 44 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 was essentially
a response to the perceived inadequacy of "gatekeeper" involvement
of the sort provided by outside directors on audit committees,
notwithstanding decades of enterprise liability risk. 45 There are
open questions about whether Sarbanes-Oxley will create the
necessary incentives. 46
If it does, then the deterrence-based
argument for private litigation enterprise liability exposure
weakens; if not, then it may just prove the futility of the effort. One
might argue that enterprise liability plus Sarbanes-Oxley's
enhancements offer the right mix, and we cannot rule that out
entirely. But it is still a speculative case, suggesting caution before
embracing the expensive current system. My prediction would be
that enterprise liability's deterrence value actually is positive, but
not all that large when other influences on director behavior are
considered. That, however, brings us back to the same point made
earlier about compensation: because the current private litigation
system is so cumbersome and expensive, it may be hard to justify
under its current design even if it does produce some benefits, giving
40. See Donald C. Langevoort, Organized Illusions: A Behavioral Theory of
Why Corporations Mislead Stock Market Investors (and Cause Other Social
Harm), 146 U. PA. L. REV. 101, 139-41 (1997).
41. To this we should add other company executives not in on the fraud,
but in a position to blow the whistle on it.
42. See Jonathan M. Karpoff et aI., The Costs to Firms of Cooking the
Books, J FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS (forthcoming) (manuscript at 1-2,
available at http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=652121.This includes a
reputational penalty above and beyond either the value-relevance of the
revealed information or the effects of lawsuits and government enforcement.
Id.
43. For the portion of actions viewed by the market as meritorious,
directors themselves pay a reputational penalty. See Helland, supra note 36, at
366.
44. Sanjai Bhagat et aI., Director Ownership, Corporate Performance, and
Management Turnover, 54 Bus. LAw. 885, 887-89 (1999).
45. E.g., Jill Fisch & Caroline Gentile, The Qualified Legal Compliance
Committee: Using Attorney Conduct Rules to Restructure the Board of Directors,
53 DUKE L.J. 517, 519-20 (2003).
46. Id. at 566-82.
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us reason to look for something better.
The enterprise liability debate is not limited to private
securities litigation. Under prodding from two of its commissioners,
the SEC issued a policy statement in January 2006 describing how
it will decide whether to seek fines against the company as opposed
(or in addition) to the individual wrongdoers,47 acknowledging that
large fines against companies-notwithstanding their publicity
value for the SEC's enforcement program-may sometimes hurt
investors more than help them. The SEC's policy statement lists a
48
disparate group of factors that will be considered. The principal
factor is whether the company benefited from the violation, which
the Commission describes in terms of a desire to avoid unjust
49
enrichment. That point is well taken, though if such benefit can
actually be demonstrated, then disgorgement, as opposed to a
penalty, would seem to be the natural move.
That issue brings up an intriguing conceptual question about
the SEC's approach-should the right standard be actual benefit, or
instead, whether the perpetrators intended to benefit the company
(at least in part) by their conduct? The latter standard is the one
used in agency law (respondeat superior)50 and works from the
following logic. If managers engage in some risky course of
deceptive conduct meant to benefit the company and it succeeds, the
shareholders are enriched and keep the gains. Assume now that the
scheme fails, either because the bet did not payoff or because the
deception was exposed, so that no actual benefits were generated.
In terms of deterrence, one would presumably want to penalize the
company then as well, lest the shareholders be left with the gains
when the deception succeeds but no penalty when it fails.
Buying into that idea, however, creates fairly broad corporate
liability exposure because, as noted earlier, most financial reporting
frauds (certainly Enron and Worldcom, for instance) are intended to
benefit the company and its shareholders, at least in part. 51 The
question is whether we really expect good deterrence as a result of a
47. SEC Statement, supra note 12; see Ralph Ferrara et aI., The SEC's
Newly Announced Standards for the Imposition of Corporate Monetary
Penalties: An Overdue Step Toward Predictability, 38 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA)
170, at 170 (Jan. 30, 2006) (suggesting that the SEC's approach should apply to
how big the corporate fine is, as well as to whether there is a fine in the first
place).
48. SEC Statement, supra note 12.
49. Id.
50. Peri Nielson & Claudia Mann, Securities Enforcement: Company
Liability After the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 18 INSIGHTS 1, 2 (2004), available at
http://www.wsgr.comIPDFSearchlInsights 1004Nielsen. pdf.
51. See Langevoort, Technological Innovation, supra note 13, at 10; Baruch
Lev, Corporate Earnings Management: Fact or Fiction?, 17 J. ECON.
PERSPECTIVES 27, 36 (2003). This is not to say that greed does not playa role as
well. Note that if greed is the only motivation, then traditional respondeat
superior principles would say that there is no vicarious liability at all.
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threat like this, which brings us back to our earlier discussion. The
Commission's choice of an actual benefit, rather than an "intent to
benefit" standard,52 presumably reflects some doubts about
respondeat superior theory as a deterrent device. If so, then it
really might just be a redundancy for disgorgement, perhaps just
. seeking to avoid the need to prove the actual amount of the benefit
as is required when disgorgement is sought in court.
On the other hand, the Commission expands the corporate
penalty threat by making difficulty of detection, scope of the fraud,
and the "need to deter" the type of offense additional factors in the
analysis. 53 It is hard to see how or why these should be important
factors if we think that shareholder liability generally produces little
deterrence in the first place. Conversely, if we have more faith in
the deterrence possibility, then the Commission's choice of the
actual benefit standard is open to criticism, especially if that is the
dominating factor.
Other factors on the list turn to compensation, insofar as the
"fair funds" provision of Sarbanes-Oxley directs the SEC to find the
victims of the fraud and use both disgorgement and penalty
54
amounts to distribute fair shares in compensation. This provision
is a useful item to consider, but is limited in two respects. First, as
noted earlier, the theory behind identifying who is injured by fraud
is hard-are active, sophisticated traders to be put in the same place
as undiversified retail investors (in which case, institutional
investors get the overwhelming amount of the fair funds proceeds)?
If not, how are the priorities to be set? Second, there is the problem
of identifying the tens of thousands of potential victims and
assessing their claims, which is a very costly process and one likely
to eat up a large portion of the amount to be distributed unless very
55
arbitrary determinations are made. The Commission obscures all
of these practical issues by simply saying that the desire to
compensate victims will be part of the corporate penalty
determination.
A final cluster of factors on the SEC's list looks at whether the
company behaved appropriately after discovering the problem, i.e.,
remediation and cooperation with the Commission and other
enforcers. 56 This consideration is important, but is meant at least
partly as a hammer vis-a-vis the board of directors, and is
controversial as a result. 57 If directors let company officials and
52.

53.
54.
55.

SEC Statement, supra note 12.
Id.
Id.
See GoV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, REPORT No. 05-760, SEC AND CFTC

PENALTIES: CONTINUED PROGRESS MADE IN COLLECTION EFFORTS, BUT GREATER
SEC MANAGEMENT ATTENTION IS NEEDED 11 (2005).
56. SEC Statement, supra note 12.
57. Robert S. Bennett et ai., Internal Investigations and the Defense of
Corporations in the Sarbanes-Oxley Era, 62 Bus. LAw. 55, 80-83 (2006).
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their lawyers fight the SEC's claims against the executives too hard,
their decision may lead directly to a corporate penalty. But
sometimes the SEC is wrong in its suspicions, so that a vigorous
corporate-funded defense of (and by) company executives is
. t'fi
JUs
I Ied .58
My sense, then, is that the SEC's 2006 policy statement is born
of the same conceptual difficulties that we struggle with in the
private securities litigation area. It is a good starting point for
constructive deliberation,
but highly indeterminate
and
unsatisfying. Both the deterrence and compensatory questions
embedded in the guidelines are more difficult than they seem at first
glance, and there really are no obvious rules of thumb for when
sanctioning the corporation is good policy in the absence of bettergrounded assumptions about deterrence and compensation.

II. A SECOND LOOK AT INDIVIDUAL EXECUTIVE LIABILITY
The preceding discussion of the problems associated with
enterprise liability takes us to the obvious question: how much could
we gain by diminishing the liability threat to the corporation and its
shareholders, and instead making it so that the individual
executives who participated in the fraud are the primary, and
maybe only, targets? If we do so, do we also need to improve the
legal framework for individual liability?
With respect to private securities litigation, these questions
have been obscured because of the impression that individual
liability could never support full (Le., often multi-billion dollar)
compensation for the fraud's victims. Thus, enterprise liability is a
practical "deep pocket" necessity on compensatory grounds,
whatever its conceptual flaws.
But as we have seen, the
compensatory case, though strong in certain instances, is weaker
than assumed. It does not require the inflated liability exposure
created by the current fraud-on-the-market system and could be
aided considerably by prioritizing distributions to those more
deserving than others.
Once we shift primary attention to
deterrence, the amount of liability exposure could be a good bit
smaller and presumably still have a sharp bite, so long as it is welltargeted. The remainder of this Article will address whether this
shift is practicable.

58. This was the basis for Judge Kaplan's decision in United States v. Stein,
435 F. Supp. 2d 330, 352-58 (S.D.N.Y. 2006), criticizing prosecutors for
pressuring the company not to advance expenses to executives, by using the
leverage of threatened prosecution of the corporation.
Recently, the
Department of Justice has revised its policies on this aspect of cooperation via
the so-called "McNulty" Memo. Memorandum from Paul J. McNulty on
Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations to the United
States Attorneys, Department of Justice 19 (Feb. 7, 2007), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/speechl2006/mcnulty_memo.pdf.
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The next step in the analysis is to look at the existing legal
regime with respect to individual liability to assess its current
status and future potential. Most discussions treat fraud-based
liability, whether enterprise or individual, as a federal securities law
issue. 59 But this is not necessarily so. Intra-corporate fraud and
breaches of the duty of candor vis-Ii-vis company stockholders create
state corporate law liability as well (and often state securities law
liability), and some federal courts have suggested that state law
ought to have primacy with respect to those frauds that are
essentially instances of corporate mismanagement. 6o So, perhaps
the better place to start in assessing executive liability exposure is
with respect to state law, particularly that of Delaware.

III. STATE LAw ON EXECUTIVE LIABILITY
There are two versions of executive "dishonesty" to consider,
and one is considerably easier than the other. The easier one is
when an executive is actively involved in creating material
misimpressions on the part of the board or company shareholders, or
fails to speak when there is a duty to do SO.61 If deliberate, this can
easily be seen as a breach of the duties of candor, loyalty, and/or
good faith. The harder questions arise when the fraudulent scheme
is designed and executed by subordinates without active
involvement by the executive. Here, the questions largely turn on
the executive's state of mind: was there knowing encouragement of
or acquiescence in the fraud, conscious or reckless disregard, simple
negligence, or no fault at all? Absent bad faith or something akin to
gross negligence, this inquiry touches on the legal question of
whether executives (as opposed to corporate directors) have the full
protection of the business judgment rule, a topic that has recently
generated a lively scholarly debate. 62
Let us put aside the hard questions for a moment and assume
59. Thompson and Sale, supra note 17, at 887,889.
60. See Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 478-80 (1977); Field v.
Trump, 850 F.2d 938,947-48 (2d Cir. 1988). For doubts about whether this is a
useful line to draw, see Donald C. Langevoort, Seeking Sunlight in Santa Fe's
Shadow: The SEC's Pursuit of Managerial Accountability, 79 WASH. U. L.Q.
449,463-64 (2001). See also Thompson & Sale, supra note 17, at 863-70.
61. The latter question is interesting in and of itself, but seems reasonably
clear (if underutilized) as a matter of state law. See Langevoort, supra note 20,
at 1199-1205.
62. Compare Lyman Johnson & David Millon, Recalling Why Corporate
Officers are Fiduciaries, 46 WM. & MARy L. REV. 1597, 1642-43 (2005), and
Lyman Johnson, Corporate Officers and the Business Judgment Rule, 60 Bus.
LAw. 439, 440-41 (2005), with Lawrence A. Hamermesh & A. Gilchrist Sparks
III, Corporate Officers and the Business Judgment Rule: A Reply to Professor
Johnson, 60 Bus. LAw. 865, 865-66, 876 (2005). See also Deborah DeMott,
Inside the Corporate Veil: The Character and Consequences of Executives' Duties
(Duke Law Sch. Legal Studies Paper No. 112, 2006), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=918524.
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that a senior executive acted intentionally, deceiving both the board
and the company shareholders as to the company's financial
condition in an effort, at least partly, to hold onto his job and
inflated compensation longer than might have been the case had the
truth been known. This is bad faith-now, it seems, a breach of
loyaltl3-and damages are a possibility upon an adequate showing
of proximate cause, at least in a derivative case. However, an
equitable remedy may also be well-suited for this kind of case, which
might be easier for plaintiffs to establish a right to in the first
instance. The explosion in executive compensation has led to
massive pay packages tied to performance, in the form of bonuses,
Typically, these
stock options, and deferred compensation. 64
incentive provisions are tied either to stock price or accounting
measures, either of which would presumably be tainted by the
fraud. Isn't there at least a straightforward case for disgorgement of
all that wealth?
Black-letter law of contracts and restitution certainly says that
there is one. Restitution allows recovery of ill-gotten gains against
those who commit a civil or criminal wrong, in order to avoid unjust
enrichment. 65 In contract terms, a breach of fiduciary duty would
presumably operate as a material breach of the contract as well,
giving the victim (the corporation) the right to seek rescission and
restitution instead of suing on the contract. 66
That much is fairly straightforward. What is often ignored
about this equitable rescission and restitution option is that it does
63. See Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 367 (Del. 2006) (noting that a lack of
good faith will constitute a breach of loyalty when there is a "sustained or
systematic failure to exercise oversight").
64. For a critical view on this compensation explosion, see LUCIAN BEBCHUK
& JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE (2004).
65. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.01 (Tentative Draft No.4,
2005); RESTATEMENT OF THE LAw: RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 43
(Tentative Draft No.4, 2005). For a sampling of restitution cases against those
who did in fact breach their fiduciary duties, see Phansalkar v. Andersen
Weinroth & Co., 344 F.3d 184, 197, 211 (2d Cir. 2003) (arguing for an expansive
scope of compensation that must be disgorged); Aramony v. United Way
Replacement Benefit Plan, 191 F.3d 140, 153-54 (2d Cir. 1999) (forcing the
former president and CEO to forfeit salary paid during his period of disloyalty);
Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi Ltd. v. Malhotra, 131 F. Supp. 2d 959, 961 (N.D. Ill.
2000) (holding forfeiture of much, but not all, compensation). This issue is also
analyzed and discussed in Deborah DeMott, Disloyal Agents, 58 ALA. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2007).
66. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAw: RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT §§ 3839 (Tentative Draft No.3, 2004). There is a debate about whether "restitution"
after rescission for breach of contract refers to avoiding unjust enrichment on
the part of the defendant or simply putting the victim back to the status quo
ante. See Andrew Kull, Rescission and Restitution, 61 BuS. LAw. 569, 574-79
(2006) (describing ALI efforts to make the latter the standard in the new
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT). Even under
the ALI's approach, unjust enrichment is the standard if the breach was
opportunistic, which it would be in the case of deliberate deceit.
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not depend on a showing of intentional or deliberate misconduct by
the person subject to the disgorgement claim. Suppose, for instance,
that plaintiffs lack evidence one way or the other on culpability, or
even that the executive was at most negligent in failing to detect
and prevent the fraud. As noted, there is a rich debate over the
protection of the business judgment rule to company executives,67
from which it might be gleaned that their liability for damages
depends on a showing of bad faith, disloyalty, or perhaps gross
But even when that is so, plaintiffs have a
negligence.
restitutionary alternative.
In In re HealthSouth Corp. Shareholders Litigation, Vice
Chancellor Strine considered a derivative action seeking rescission
and restitution with respect to an agreement between then-CEO
Richard Scrushy and HealthSouth to extinguish a $25 million loan
that he owed the company.68 The consideration for extinguishing the
loan was the return of HealthSouth stock of comparable market
value that he had purchased with the money.69 Soon thereafter,
accounting irregularities at the company came to light, and the
market price of the stock dropped precipitously.70 Plaintiffs claimed
that Scrushy was unjustly enriched by discharging a debt with
overvalued stock.71 The Vice Chancellor granted their motion for
. d gment .72
summary JU
Although there certainly were public allegations of Scrushy's
involvement in the fraud (though he was later acquitted of criminal
charges in a widely-publicized and controversial trial),73 plaintiffs in
the derivative action made no claim of knowledge or intentional
involvement. Rather, they argued that even if he were uninvolved
in the wrongdoing, he was still unjustly enriched by benefiting from
the overvalued stock. 74 Vice-Chancellor Strine agreed, finding that
Scrushy as CEO was "charged with managerial responsibility for

67. See Johnson, supra note 62, at 453-55.
68. 845 A.2d 1096, 1100, 1103 (Del. Ch. 2003); see also Thorpe v. Cerbco,
676 A.2d 436, 445 (Del. 1996) (noting that even if the fiduciary did not profit at
the corporation's expense, the profit is still considered unjust enrichment); Hills
Stores Co. v. Bozic, 769 A.2d 88, 110-11 n.74 (Del. Ch. 2000) ("Even if [the
defendants] can convince me that they had no role in causing any excessive
payments to themselves, they still would be unjustly enriched if they received
them. Just as someone can't keep a mistakenly excessive tax refund or
automatic teller payout, these defendants cannot hold on to overpayments from
the company to which they owed fiduciary duties."). For a brief discussion of In
re HealthSouth, see Mark Loewenstein, The Quiet Transformation of Corporate
Law, 57 SMU L. REV. 353, 360 n.36 (2004).
69. HealthSouth, 845 A.2d at 1100.
70. Id. at 1100-0l.
71. Id. at 1103.
72. Id. at 1110.
73. Patti Bond, Ex-CEO Scrushy Cleared, ATLANTA J.-CONST., June 29,
2005, atAl.
74. HealthSouth, 845 A.2d at 1099.
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overseeing the preparation of accurate and reliable financial
statements.,,75 Hence, "[w]hether or not Scrushy breached any
cognizable duty in signing those statements, he was undoubtedly
unjustly enriched when the company of which he was a fiduciary
bought back shares from him at a price inflated by false financial
statements he had signed.,,76 Strine said that the same conclusion
could be grounded under the law of innocent misrepresentation (or
equitable fraud), which is a variant of mutual mistake in contract
77
Iaw.
This is a powerful holding when one considers its implications.
To be sure, at issue was an extraordinary loan transaction (of a kind
no longer permissible after Sarbanes-Oxley), which made the case
easier. But suppose that the board of directors had simply awarded
Scrushy some additional incentive-based compensation or renewed
his contract at a higher compensation package at a time when the
same could be said about the accuracy of HealthSouth's financial
reporting. If the board might have been led to do so by a false sense
of company performance, the same equitable remedy would
seemingly apply-restitution of the tainted compensation. A recent
decision also involving Scrushy by the Alabama Supreme Court,
Scrushy v. Tucker,78 does precisely this, citing HealthSouth in
support of requiring forfeiture of Scrushy's tainted bonuses: "As
between Scrushy and HealthSouth, it would be unconscionable to
allow Scrushy to retain millions of dollars awarded to him in the
form of bonuses at the expense of the corporation he served as chief
executive officer [of] and its shareholders.,,79 Here again, the court
said that this result would be so even if Scrushy were entirely
uninvolved in the misreporting. 80
With respect to compensation pursuant to contractual
75. [d. at 1105.
76. [d. at 1106.
77. [d. at 1106-07. In a subsequent limited liability company case
involving claims for damage liability rather than unjust enrichment, Vice
Chancellor Strine indicated that notwithstanding HealthSouth, plaintiffs
should have to show a breach of fiduciary duty by the company official to prevail
against that official under an equitable fraud claim, lest the protections of the
business judgment rule be too easily lost. Metro Commc'n. Corp. BVI v.
Advanced Mobilecomm Techs. Inc., 854 A.2d 121, 163 n.102 (Del. Ch. 2004). Ct
Shamrock Holdings of Cal., Inc. v. Iger, No. CIV.A.1330-N, 2005 WL 1377490,
at *7 (Del. Ch. June 6, 2005) (involving a claim for equitable relief).
78. 955 So. 2d 988 (Ala. 2006). The presence of litigation involving Scrushy
and HealthSouth in both Delaware and Alabama raises an interesting choice of
law question-is the restitutionary alternative based on the internal affairs
doctrine, so that the state of incorporation takes primacy--or can the state in
which the tainted compensation was paid also plausibly assert subject matter
jurisdiction as a matter of contract law? Given the contractual nature of
compensation, it is hard to argue that only the state of incorporation has
authority here.
79. [d. at 1012.
80. [d.
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agreement between the executive and the company, the issues are
pretty much the same. To the extent that the contract was made
after the fraud began (even assuming the executive is unaware of it),
it is entirely justifiable to employ contract formation defenses, such
as mutual mistake or innocent misrepresentation, to set aside the
contract and permit restitution by the issuer. One court, in Miller v.
U.S. Foodservice, Inc.,8! casts doubt on whether this should be so,
but in so doing seems to take an unnecessarily narrow view of the
law of mistake. Miller suggests that the company (through the
actions of the board of directors) assumes the risk that the financials
might be misstated in contracting with the executive. 82 But, where
one party is better positioned to either spot or prevent the problem,
that party is typically allocated the risk, and in the corporate
context-as both HealthSouth and Scrushy emphasize-the CEO is
the better-positioned party.83 Another concern raised in Miller is
that the remedy seems draconian. 84 But assuming that an executive
had acted in good faith, this would not leave him out in the cold.
Equity would give him an offsetting quasi-contractual claim against
the company for the reasonable value of his services during the time
in question, given the truth about the company's performance.
However, the difference, the amount returned to the company and
its shareholders, could still be considerable. 85 The other contractual
setting is where the contract predates the fraud. Here, the role for
unjust enrichment in the absence of a showing of culpability is
smaller, limited to those portions of the compensation that were
determined or otherwise tainted by the inaccurate financial
statements.
The unjust enrichment approach seems so easy and
straightforward that we might predict that these kinds of cases
should become commonplace against executives after companies
with which they are associated get caught up in scandal. Indeed,
these cases are common, and ongoing litigation now regularly cites
these cases in efforts to recoup. The recent options-backdating
81. 361 F. Supp. 2d 470, 484-85 (D. Md. 2005) (doubting whether
restitution should playa significant role where an unbreached contract exists
between the executive and the company, notwithstanding severe corporate
fraud). Miller should be read in light of its primary holding-that the CEO did
breach his fiduciary duty and hence, was liable to the company for both
restitution and damages on that ground.
82. Id. at 484 n.13.
83. On the law of mistake and avoidance in this setting where the executive
is complicit, see DeMott, supra notes 62 and 65 (comparing U.S. and British
cases); Catherine MacMillan, How Temptation Leads to Mistake: An
Explanation of Bell v. Lever Brothers, 119 L.Q. REV. 625 (2003) (discussing a
British case regarding the validity of a severance agreement made before the
board was fully aware of the agents' self-dealing).
84. Miller, 361 F. Supp. 2d at 485.
85. Also, to the extent that the executive somehow lacked "clean hands,"
his offsetting recovery could be reduced or denied entirely.
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scandals have been a particularly compelling opportunity to make
unjust enrichment arguments. To the extent that HealthSouth and
Scrushy are followed and extended, the state law trend would be
important in assessing the law relating to individual as opposed to
enterprise liability. So, we should turn to the obstacles to recovery
in restitution.
The incentives for derivative plaintiffs to bring the cases seem
sufficient. A suit can be brought against the senior management
team, which may include a sizable number of executives, and the
aggregate amount of compensation subject to disgorgement should
be large enough to justify the litigation risk and expenses, especially
if state of mind (always the hardest issue) is not a necessary
element. 86 Recall that in HealthSouth, plaintiffs succeeded on a
motion for summary judgment, not even needing to go to trial. 87 To
be sure, insurance coverage is not available with respect to an
unjust enrichment claim, so that defendants might be highly
motivated to defend their wealth aggressively.88 But the law still
seems stacked against them.
The more serious obstacles are twofold.
One deals with
contractability. In HealthSouth, Vice Chancellor Strine observed
that there was no contractual impediment to the claim for
restitution, because no contractual language addressed the matter
in question (the loan forgiveness).89 Miller, by contrast, emphasized
the presence of the compensation contract in saying the restitution
had no place. 90 Executives often negotiate detailed compensation
contracts under circumstances that give them substantial leeway in
extracting favorable terms.91 Such contracts not infrequently limit
86. There can be questions in terms of personal jurisdiction over the
individual defendants, although Delaware's recent change in the law makes it
easier to sue high-ranking officers in Delaware court. There is always the
option of suing in the jurisdiction where the company's principal offices are
located, though that loses the expertise of the Delaware judiciary.
87. In re HeathSouth Corp. S'holders Litig., 845 A.2d 1096, 1110 (Del. Ch.
2003).
88. Although such claims are outside the scope of the standard policy, one
cannot simply assume that insurers would not be pressured to find some way to
settle such cases within the scope of the policy. For concerns about the relative
indifference of insurers to scope questions (particularly the "fraud" exclusion),
see Tom Baker & Sean Griffith, The Missing Monitor in Corporate Governance:
The Directors' & Officers' Liability Insurer, 95 GEO. L.J. 1795, 1805 (2007). One
problem is that issuers have in large numbers obtained insurance policies for
their own liability, so that neither they nor the insurers have that much
interest in the apportionment question. See id. at 1802-03; Coffee, supra note
2, at 1569-70.
89. HealthSouth, 845 A.2d at 1109 n.27.
90. Miller v. U.S. Foodservice Inc., 361 F. Supp. 2d 470, 483 (D. Md. 2005).
91. See Randall Thomas & Stewart Schwab, An Empirical Analysis of CEO
Employment Contracts: What Do Top Executives Bargain For?, 63 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 231, 241 (2006); David Yermack, Golden Handshakes: Separation Pay
for Retired and Dismissed CEO's, 41 J. ACCT. & ECON. 237,237-38 (2006).
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the ability of the company to terminate executives' employment,
except on a very stringent showing of cause, and trigger lucrative
severance packages when a termination is without cause. 92 One can
imagine a provision that explicitly makes this the limited and
exclusive remedy for the corporation in an effort to bar recapture of
money already paid under the contract absent cause. Indeed, there
are many contractual variations by which executives might seek to
protect their compensation against the kind of remedy afforded the
plaintiffs in HealthSouth and Scrushy.
The general rule of contract law with respect to restitutionary
remedies for breach is that they can be waived or revised ex ante, so
long as the limitation is clearly stated and not unconscionable or
otherwise in violation of public policy.93 This rule is subject to an
overriding rule of some importance, however: that the contract
containing the limitation not itself be tainted by fraud. 94 In another
recent and somewhat controversial opinion by Vice Chancellor
Strine involving a sale of business transaction, he held that the
remedy of rescission and restitution was available to the plaintiffs
even though the contract disclaimed such a remedy, because the
fraud preceded the making of the contract and thus rendered the
whole contract, including the disclaimer, unenforceable. 95 To the
extent that the start to the fraudulent scheme preceded the
executive compensation contract, the same reasoning might well
apply. The same would be true if the contract was tainted by some
other procedural defect, for example, if the process by which it was
negotiated involved a breach of fiduciary duty as a result of gross
96
·
neg11gence.
Assuming not, however, the question turns into one of public
policy.
Would a limitation of remedy clause essentially
guaranteeing that an executive retains extraordinary compensation
notwithstanding corporate wrongdoing be a violation of public
92. See Charles Forelle & Mark Maremont, UnitedHealth's McGuire Could
Leave with $1.1 Billion, WALL ST. J., Oct. 17, 2006, at Bl. According to this
report, McGuire, who left UnitedHealth in connection with an options
backdating scandal, had a contract that limited "cause" to either a felony
conviction or a repeated failure to remedy a serious problem despite repeated
notices demanding that it be cleaned up. [d.; see also Lublin & Thurm, supra
note 5, at B1 (quoting one lawyer as saying that for a board to fire a CEO for
cause, "you have to burn the building down or have major, major
embezzlement").
On the policy issues raised by termination provisions
generally, see Geof Stapledon, Termination Benefits for Executives of Australian
Companies, 27 SYDNEY L. REV. 683, 683 (2005) (surveying U.S., U.K., and
Australian authorities and guidance regarding termination payments).
93. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 356 cmt. a (1981)
(recognizing the rights of parties to revise and limit contractual remedies).
94. Abry Partners V, L.P. v. F&W Acquisition L.L.C., 891 A.2d 1032, 1048
n.26 (Del. Ch. 2006).
95. [d. at 1064.
96. See infra notes 97-99 and accompanying text.
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policy? The answer would seem to depend on the executive's
behavior. If the executive was complicit in the fraud and acted in
bad faith, the retention of benefits would offend any number of basic
principles of corporation law. An ultra-narrow definition of cause or
limited remedy provision that essentially immunizes the executive
from restitutionary liability for breach of fiduciary duty encourages
breach without offering any offsetting justification (risk allocation,
etc.). A useful analogy here might be to the law of indemnification,
which bars the company from reimbursing officers and directors for
fines, judgments, or expenses, unless the board finds that the party
seeking reimbursement acted in good faith and in a manner
reasonably believed to be in the best interests of the company. By
97
most accounts, this bar cannot be overridden by contract.
A
contractual override of basic restitutionary principles operates
almost identically, and is equally suspect. Arguably, one might
extend this principle beyond bad faith to conduct in good faith, but
that could not reasonably be thought to be in the company's best
interests, which might include recklessness or gross negligence. On
the other hand, it would be harder to strike down on public policy
grounds a limitation on restitution with respect to innocent or
simply negligent conduct. This is more properly a matter of risk
allocation, and Delaware's presumption of free contractability
regarding the terms and conditions for executive employment is
probably strong enough to protect a clause such as this. This is
significant, however, because this kind of contractual limitation
would alter the incentive structure for litigation-to the extent that
plaintiffs are forced to show bad faith or something equivalent to get
around the limitations on remedies, their case is more difficult and
risky. We could expect fewer such suits, then, to the extent that
aggressive contractual protection became commonplace.
But there may be an even larger hurdle if the corporation's
independent directors choose not to seek full restitution against the
executive and recommend termination of the derivative suit as a
matter of business judgment. This gets us into a subject well
beyond the scope of this Article. A board might be protective of a
senior officer whom they decided not to terminate notwithstanding
the scandal, although this is increasingly less common given public
relations concerns and enforcement pressure. More likely, at least
97. See Waltuch v. Conticommodity Servs. Inc., 88 F.3d 87, 92 (2d Cir.
1996) (construing Delaware law regarding indemnification); see also E. Norman
Veasey et aI., Delaware Supports Directors with a Three-Legged Stool of Limited
Liability, Indemnification and Insurance, 42 Bus. LAW. 399,412 (1987). In In re
Cendant Corp. Securities Litigation, the court rejected a claim that a settlement
excluding individual liability operated as impermissible indemnification. 264
F.3d 284, 301 (3d Cir. 2001). My argument here is different: that an actual
payment by the company pursuant to contract should, by analogy, be deemed
against public policy if it had the effect of enriching the defendant
notwithstanding bad faith or lack of corporate best interests.
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some senior officials will be terminated regardless of evidence of
complicity, assuming the scandal is serious enough. However, the
termination will often be on mutually agreeable terms that leave the
executive with a large severance package, in essence protecting the
wealth created during the period in question. There are many
reasons why this might be: loyalty or sympathy for the executive
who has been forced out because of media, investor, or regulatory
pressure is one possibility; the more likely reason is to avoid the
expensive, messy publicity and liability risk associated with
litigation against the executive over whether the termination was
permissible, who else was at fault, and so on.
Assuming that demand is not excused or the special litigation
committee is composed of sufficiently independent directors, there
are significant, though not necessarily insuperable, hurdles. In
terms of the thoroughness of the investigatory process, one
interesting question is whether the reviewing directors were
sufficiently aware of" and considered the potency of the
restitutionary remedies that cases like HealthSouth afford the
corporation, so that if it was foregone, they could plausibly explain
why.
(In a demand-excused case, this would be an explicit
inquiry.)98 A conclusion, after thorough investigation, that litigation
against the executive would be difficult, risky,
and
counterproductive to the corporation's need to "move forward" from
its troubles would probably receive deference. But if the Delaware
chancery judges were so inclined, they could breathe more life into
the restitutionary threat by taking a hard look at cases where the
board allows an executive to walk away substantially enriched,
notwithstanding plausible allegations of misconduct. 99
In sum, Delaware law affords the corporation considerable
ability to seek rescission and restitution for breach of contract in the
form of breach of fiduciary duty, thereby putting the individual
executives at risk with respect to their incentive compensation. But
there are practical questions about the incentive structure for
aggressively pursuing equitable remedies via a derivative suit. So,
while this is potentially fertile ground for remedial action against
individual executives complicit in (or benefiting from) fraud,
Delaware law requires further articulation to see just how great the
potential really is, and in the absence of evidence that the Delaware
chancery judges will encourage efforts to seek disgorgement, the
more likely remedies will be federal, not state remedies.

98. Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 787 (Del. 1981).
99. In Desimone u. Barrows, 924 A.2d 908, 950-51 (Del. Ch. 2007), Vice
Chancellor Strine refused to consider evidence that the directors in a stock
options backdating case had not been aggressive enough in pursuing the
individuals accused of wrongdoing in assessing whether demand is required or
excused.
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FEDERAL LAW

Private Lawsuits

Corporate liability is a derivative of individual liability; by and
large (with a few exceptions), courts have rejected the idea that
there can be enterprise liability under Rule 10b-5 without a showing
that at least one natural person acting within the scope of his or her
loo
authority was primarily liable.
In that sense, individual executive
liability is the starting point under federal law, and the key issues
in private litigation focus on executive culpability.
For our
purposes, that means that sanctioning individuals upon a
determination of culpability should be fairly straightforward.
There are, however, notorious obstacles even if we assume that
plaintiffs can demonstrate materially false statements or omissions.
Cases under Rule 10b-5 require a showing of scienter (knowledge or
recklessness), and Congress has made bringing a case more difficult
by requiring a showing by the plaintiff of facts giving rise to a strong
inference of scienter before discovery can begin. IOI Courts recently
have become much stricter in requiring plaintiffs to make this
showing with respect to each individual executive charged with
responsibility, rejecting "group pleading" efforts to assert that
executives are presumed to know what other members of the control
I02
group knoW.
This difficulty is avoided if the company made a
registered public offering of securities during the time of the
misconduct with respect to executives who signed the registration
statement, because Section 11 lawsuits under the Securities Act
merely require a showing of lack of due diligence on the executive's
103
part.
Also a potential obstacle is the requirement that any person
sued under Rule 10b-5 in a private lawsuit be a "primary" violator.lo4
In some circuits, this requirement means that the filing or publicity
alleged to be fraudulent must identify the individual as at least
partly responsible for its production, so that behind-the-scenes

100. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
101. See William S. Lerach & Eric Alan Isaacson, Pleading Scienter Under
Section 21D(B)(2) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934: Motive, Opportunity,
and Recklessness and the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 33
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 893, 896 (1996). This requirement was analyzed by the
Supreme Court in Tellabs, Inc. v. Makar Issues & Rights, Ltd., 127 S.Ct. 2499
(2007).
102. See Southland Sec. Corp. v. Inspire Ins. Solutions Inc., 365 F.3d 353,
365 (5th Cir. 2004); William O. Fisher, Don't Call Me a Securities Law Groupie:
The Rise and Possible Demise of the "Group Pleading" Protocol in 10b-5 Cases,
56 Bus. LAW. 991, 1049-53 (2001).
103. Section 11, however, limits non-director executive liability to the
signatories of the registration statement, thus excluding most of the senior
management team.
104. See Fisher, supra note 102, at 1031-33.
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actors escape liability. !Os This result may narrow the number of
executives against whom the action can be brought, although CEOs
and CFOs are less likely to gain much benefit here because
signature and (after Sarbanes-Oxley) certification requirements
create the necessary attribution with respect to SEC filings. lOG
Lesser senior executives plainly benefit from this line of case law.
On the other hand, the benefit may be partially overcome to the
extent that plaintiffs persuade the court that those executives are
part of the control group of the corporation, which makes them
presumptively liable unless they acted in good faith and did not
lo7
directly or indirectly induce the violation.
A third factor in restricting individual executive liability
exposure is another product of Congress's reforms in 1995,
proportionate liability. To the extent that a defendant acted without
actual knowledge of the fraud in a Rule 10b-5 case, joint and several
liability is replaced by proportionate fault, wherein the jury
apportions to the individual only his share of liability. lOB In a case
where a large number of persons may have contributed to the fraud,
this can bring down individual liability exposure considerably. With
respect to company executives, proportionate liability does not apply
in Section 11 cases.
Finally, many courts say that the plaintiffs case must allege
something more than mere "corporate mismanagement" against the
executives. 109
This requirement is not a problem when the
misconduct operates as a fraud on purchasers or sellers of company
stock by concealing financially material information, and hence does
not apply to accounting scandals.
But reckless or disloyal
managerial behavior can sometimes be hard to reach under this line
of cases if not part of some scheme, the exposure of which caused a
significant drop in the price of the company's stock.
Each of the foregoing examples is significant, but not enough
that we can say that dishonest executives readily escape liability as
a matter of law when there is a significant scandal at the company.
Proving that there was in fact a scandal and that any particular
executive was dishonest can be hard, but that is not my main
concern. Again, proving the scandal and the involvement of at least
one executive in its perpetration is normally essential to creating
enterprise liability as well.
Instead, the explanation for why settlements in securities
105. See Wright v. Ernst & Young LLP, 152 F.3d 169, 174-75 (2d Cir. 1995);
SEC v. Lucent Techs. Inc., 363 F. Supp. 2d 70S, 720, 723-24 (D.N.J. 2005).
106. 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.13a-14, 240.15d-14 (2006); see Lisa Fairfax, Form Over
Substance? Official Certification and the Promise of Enhanced Personal
Accountability Under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 55 RUTGERS L. REV. 1, 13-15, lS20 (2002).
107. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 20(a), 15 U.S.C. § 7S(t)(u) (2000).
lOS. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 21(d)(6), 15 U.S.C. § 7Su-3 (2000).
109. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
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actions tend to neglect individual executive responsibility is one of
negotiation dynamics. Plaintiffs want the largest sum of money
possible, with-until recently in some high profile cases 11°-little
care about who was funding it. Because it comes out of their
pockets, the individual defendants can be expected to resist personal
liability more strongly than the board of directors will resist
corporate payment (the board is also aware that amounts paid by
executives in a class action settlement may trigger indemnification
rights anyway). And both the company and executives will seek
substantial participation in the settlement from the D&O insurers,
who appear to be quite willing to participate as long as settlement
patterns are predictable enough that the costs can be passed on in
the form of higher premiums, even though fraud is contractually
lll
outside the scope of coverage.
Hence, the result mentioned earlier:
nearly the entire settlement funding tends to come from the
company and the insurers.ll2 Individuals are largely ignored,
however culpable. Concern about unjust enrichment has not been a
significant factor in the resolution of fraud-on-the-market cases.
That may be changing, of course, as plaintiffs' lawyers recognize
the risk that investors will come to realize the extent to which they
fund the system almost entirely. Again, there is nothing more than
difficulty and expense standing in the way of greater individual
liability once the underlying fraud is proved, and the difficulty and
expense is not preclusive. But it probably does require plaintiffs
and their lawyers to act against short-term self-interest by turning
down settlement offers that shift responsibility away from the
individuals, and that is not something we can predict will happen
consistently.
The interesting question is how plaintiffs' behavior would
change if we abolished or significantly curtailed enterprise liability,
leaving only (or mainly) insurance money and the individual
executives' assets on the table. The answer is far from clear. It
might be, as we observe in other settings such as medical
malpractice, that insurance would become the sole source of
funding, which in turn might create a game of chicken regarding the
size of corporate D&O insurance policies. Moreover, to the extent
that individual assets became more of the target, individual
executives could be expected to engage in more aggressive asset
protection strategies, raising the cost and risk associated with
reaching those assets, and to insist on very strong litigation defense,
110. See, e.g., Bernard Black et aI., Outside Director Liability, 58 STAN. L.
REV. 1055, 1057-58 (2006); Brooke A. Masters & Kathleen Day, 10 ExWorldCom Directors Agree to Settlement, WASH. POST, Jan. 6, 2005, at El.
111. See Kent D. Syverud, On the Demand for Liability Insurance, 72 TEX. L.
REV. 1629, 1644-48 (1994).
112. See supra note 88 and accompanying text. On the insurance problems,
see Baker & Griffith, supra note 88, at 1820; Syverud, supra note 111, at 163435.
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which is, at least in the first instance, at company expense.
Either of these outcomes might simply reduce the number of
private lawsuits (meritorious as well as nonmeritorious) without
producing many benefits in terms of compensation or deterrence.113
On the other hand, it could create sufficient incentive so that more
resources would be directed at individual involvement in the fraud.
We observe a steady stream of private lawsuits brought under
Section 16(b) against executives and large shareholders for
disgorgement of short-swing insider trading profits, for example,
even though there is neither insurance nor enterprise liability.
Admittedly, however, Section 16(b) cases are easier to prove than
Rule 10b-5 violations.

B.

SEC Enforcement
The SEC avoids many of the restrictions imposed on private
litigants in fraud actions involving company executives.
The
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act's ("PSLRA") heightened
pleading standard does not apply to SEC enforcement actions;
indeed, the SEC can avoid having to prove scienter if it is likely to
be troublesome by charging the executive with liability under
Section 17(a) of the Securities Act, which permits negligence-based
actions. 114 Nor does it have to worry excessively about the "primary"
liability case law, because it can bring actions against aiders and
abettors. 115 The SEC does not have to prove losses either, or be
concerned about proportionate liability limitations.
So far as substantive law is concerned, in fact, what is
remarkable is the breadth of the SEC's ability to reach individual
corporate executives. It is by no means just a matter of antifraud
liability under Rule lOb-5 or Section 17(a), but a host of specific
rules that reach deeply inside the corporation. For example, Rule
13b2-2 bars not only direct efforts to mislead accountants, but also
actions to "coerce, manipulate. . . or fraudulently influence" them
with respect to material financial reporting matters.116 Also, any
false or misleading record that an executive puts into the accounting
system violates Rule 13b2-1.!17
Where fraud is alleged, the law's scope is extensive as well.
There is no question of the law's ability to reach executives'
participation in any fraud influencing the investing public, but as I
have described elsewhere, even intra-company frauds are likely
113. There is evidence that the expected value necessary for plaintiffs'
lawyers to bring a class action suit has gone up in recent years, reflecting the
increasing cost and difficulty of succeeding. See Choi & Thompson, supra note
9, at 1497.
114. See Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680,695-97 (1980).
115. See SEC v. Lucent Techs. Inc., 363 F. Supp. 3d 703, 723-24 (D.N.J.
2005).
116. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13b2-2 (2006).
117. Id. § 240. 13b2-1.
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subject to sanction. liS
If a senior executive omits material
information in a presentation to the board of directors, that is
considered securities fraud so long as it has the requisite connection
to the purchase or sale of securities. For example, board grants of
options-based compensation certainly satisfy that standard, so that
if there is a causal link between the two (e.g., the presentation
created a misleadingly favorable impression that influenced the
compensation decision), the SEC could charge the executive with
fraud. 119 It is hard to imagine many forms of executive dishonesty
that the Commission could not reach as a matter of law.
The Commission's remedial tools are extensive as well,
including the ability to seek civil penalties with respect to the
violation of any provision or rule, the ability to gain disgorgement of
any gains or profits tainted by a violation, and a bar against officers
from continued employment in that role at a public company if the
violation demonstrates substantial unfitness to serve. 120
Two
provisions added by Sarbanes-Oxley underscore the SEC's ability to
reach ill-gotten gains. One is the ability to seek a temporary freeze
authority over extraordinary payments that the issuer is about to
121
pay to company executives.
The other requires the forfeiture by
the CEO and CFO of any bonuses and other incentive compensation,
plus profits from the sale of securities when the issuer restates its
financials because of "material noncompliance... as a result of
misconduct, with any financial reporting requirement under the
securities laws.,,122 A plain reading of the statute does not require
that the misconduct be the fault of the CEO or CFO, so that
executives are at risk simply from being in charge when accounting
problems occur due to someone's misconduct. This latter provision
is potentially even more potent than the principle announced in
HealthSouth under Delaware law, because there is no requirement

118. See Langevoort, Agency Law, supra note 20, at 1208-10; see also
Donald C. Langevoort & G. Mitu Gulati, The Muddled Duty to Disclose Under
Rule lOb-5, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1639, 1656-57 (2004).
119. This example is of significance in the recent flurry of enforcement
activity charging company officials with options backdating and so-called
"spring-loading." Where the board is left in the dark, liability should follow;
questions are much harder-requiring some sort of theory relating to
misrepresentation of executive compensation-if the board is aware of the
insiders' benefit.
120. See JAMES D. Cox ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS
817-20 (5th ed. 2006).
121. See SEC v. Gemstar-TV Guide Int'l, Inc., 401 F.3d 1031, 1036 (9th Cir.
2005).
122. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, §304, 116 Stat. 745,
778 (2003) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 7243 (2005». On private
enforcement of this provision, see infra notes 132 and 143 and accompanying
text. For an argument that personal wrongdoing should be required, see John
P. Kelsh, Section 304 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002: The Case for a Personal
Culpability Requirement, 59 Bus. LAW. 1005 (2004).
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that the compensation specifically be tied to assumptions about the
accuracy of the company's financials or its share price, and because
it reaches even trading profits made in transactions with third
parties.
Given this substantive and remedial breadth, the SEC has the
power to leave dishonest company executives "naked, homeless and
without wheels," but often the SEC does not, choosing instead to
settle cases without impressive sanctions against the individuals
involved,123 leaving the suspicion that executives may have walked
away from the settlement table with substantial wealth still in their
pockets. This pattern is changing, but it is still worth asking why
the Commission might tradeoff sanctions against the company for
aggressively sanctioning the individuals. To a large extent, the
answer likely mirrors the dynamics in the settlement of private
securities litigation. The SEC has too few resources for all the work
it is asked to do, and hence seeks settlement rather than continued
litigation of its enforcement actions. It is easier to get a board of
directors to accept a penalty against the company than it is to get
individuals to agree to painful personal sanctions. The corporate
sanction avoids the need to attribute fault to any particular
individual under circumstances where there is likely mutual finger
pointing about who is to blame. For all these reasons, company
sanctions are the path of least resistance; the SEC can claim its
victory and move its resources to new matters that deserve
attention. There is probably a publicity-related reason as well:
sanctions against companies can be large enough to grab headlines,
which is less likely to occur with respect to individual sanctions,
even in the aggregate.
The problem of limited resources affects not only the disposition
of cases actually brought by the SEC, but also means that there will
probably be many matters that the SEC would investigate if it had
the available staff, but simply cannot. This concern over shortage of
resources is the standard argument for supplementing SEC
enforcement with private rights of action under the securities
laws. 124 Deterrence against individual executives is less than it
should be if the SEC must forego promising enforcement actions,
regardless of its position with respect to individual versus enterprise
liability.

v.

POSSIBILITIES FOR IMPROVEMENT

As noted earlier, the impulse to use enterprise liability as a tool
123. See Coffee, supra note 2, at 1536-37.
124. But see James D. Cox & Randall Thomas (with Dana Kiku), Public and
Private Enforcement of the Securities Laws: Have Things Changed Since
Enron?, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 893, 897 (2004) (expressing concern that many
private actions piggyback on SEC investigations, raising the question of
whether they really provide a useful supplement).
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is a response to the challenges associated with individual liability.
These are daunting problems that do not easily disappear, even if
deterrence rather than compensation is made the primary goal.
Indemnification, insurance, and asset protection strategies may
reduce the pain that the individual executive feels from a sanction
ex post.
There are also the practical problems of assessing
individual executive culpability in complex organizations with
diffused lines of authority and the fear that if the liability system is
made draconian, it will either induce excess caution or lead to
demands for greater compensation ex ante for the risk ofliability.
A focus on unjust enrichment avoids some of these problems,
but not all. It also naturally invites the objection that it is too little
a threat-that given the problems with detection and litigation
incentives, the optimal penalty has to exceed the amount of the gain
in order to deter efficiently. I agree and would want the system to
create more of a liability threat than simply disgorgement. Keep in
mind, however, that executives do face significant threats in
addition to this possibility of disgorgement: harm to reputation and
livelihood can be considerable;125 the SEC can always impose
penalties and an officer/director bar in addition to disgorgement
remedies;126 and the threat of criminal prosecution with severe jail
sentences is always present.
That notwithstanding, I want to turn to some other possibilities
for making changes in the legal landscape that might improve the
probability that executives caught up in misconduct will lose the
wealth gained from being in control during the time of the fraud.

A.

Incentives in Private Litigation
Plaintiffs' lawyers act in an economically rational fashion: they
pursue cases that generate the largest net gains, preferably in
settlement rather than costly litigation. This tendency produces a
bias toward pursuing D&O insurance coverage and enterprise
liability, because pay-out decisions are not made by those paying out
of their own pockets.
Jack Coffee has made the useful suggestion that this bias be
countered by adjusting attorneys' fees in settled and litigated

125. See Hemang Desai et aI., The Reputational Penalty for Aggressive
Accounting: Earnings Restatements and Managerial Turnover, 81 ACCT. REV.
83, 85 (2006) (reporting that turnover of a high ranking official after a
restatement is approximately 60%, compared to 35% when there is no such
restatement); Karpoff, supra note 42, at 2. Earlier work largely doubted that
there was much turnover effect. See Anup Agrawal et aI., Management
Turnover and Governance Changes Following the Revelation of Fraud, 42 J.L. &
ECON. 309, 339 (1999). It is possible that recent changes-including the policies
of the Justice Department and the SEC to credit companies ifthey have reacted
aggressively to the allegations of fraud and cooperated with investigators-have
made terminations more commonplace.
126. See Karpoff, supra note 6, at 32-33.
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actions so that the lawyers would recover a greater percentage or
amount to the extent that the money was paid by individual
wrongdoers. 127 The question, of course, is how much greater the
bounty payment needs to be to cause a shift? Too great a percentage
becomes at least politically troubling to the extent that it shifts more
money from defendant to plaintiffs' lawyer, skipping the supposed
victims, and tempting a greater number of suits to be brought for
At the very least, courts approving
their settlement value.
settlements would have to be more careful (and work harder) in this
setting.
Too small an additional percentage, on the other hand, might
leave the lawyers preferring to take advantage of the gross liability
threat to the corporation as their main leverage in settlement talks.
I have suggested elsewhere that corporate liability be capped, both
to bring damage liability closer to the optimal and in order to
eliminate this excessive leverage. 128 The hard question is whether
such caps would leave in place enough incentive for lawyers to bring
meritorious lawsuits. My sense is that the caps could be set in a
way that would. Additionally, if a bounty were then added for
uninsured and unindemnified recoveries against wrongdoing
executives, there would be substantial incentive to exceed the
company-funded baseline, notwithstanding the costs.
Without necessarily endorsing it as a reform, one could at least
imagine abandoning the fraud-on-the-market presumption of
reliance in cases involving nontrading issuers 129-the key to class
actions seeking recovery for corporate fraud-and still retain room
for deterrence and restitution. Such a change would eliminate class
actions as a remedial device, but still permit large shareholders to
bring suit for fraud, either under Rule 1Ob-5, or, in a case involving
false filings with the SEC, Section 18 of the Securities Exchange
Act. In such an action, it would be fairly easy (and perhaps already
so as a matter of law)130 to allow restitution as an ancillary remedy
on top of whatever actual damages the plaintiffs can show, again
with an attorney's fee bounty for successful recovery against
company officers. The remainder of the restitutionary amount
127. Coffee, supra note 2, at 1581-82.
128. See Langevoort, supra note 7, at 657-60.
129. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 245, 250 (1988) (holding that
in fraud-on-the-market cases, reliance is a rebuttable presumption). For such a
proposal, see Mahoney, supra note 23, at 670; see also Coffee, supra note 2, at
1582-84. On the difficulties for the fraud-on-the-market theory if one assumes
some degree of investor irrationality in the setting of stock prices, see
Langevoort, supra note 30, at 137; Ribstein, supra note 8, at 139-40.
130. See Deckert v. Independence Shares Corp., 311 U.S. 282, 287-90 (1940)
(noting that the Securities Act does not restrict relief under its provisions to
monetary judgments). Also worth remembering is Section 29(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act, which renders contracts made in violation of the Act
voidable. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78cc; see COX ET AL.,
supra note 120, at 782-89.
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would then be returned to the corporation or transferred to the SEC,
as the court directs.

B.

Director Accountability
As a matter of state corporate law, directors are well positioned
to recoup ill-gotten gains from executives who have been unjustly
enriched by their activities; the question is whether they have the
motivation and incentive to do so. One way of turning up the
pressure is to hold the directors more accountable for their
decisions. Coffee suggests that the SEC require-in the event of
settlement of private securities litigation-a filed statement from
the board of directors as to the fairness of the settlement in light of
concerns that money simply paid by the company or its insurance
carrier hurts, rather than helps, shareholders. 131 This change, too,
would be helpful, though its benefits might be small in the
predictable situation where the board denies widespread individual
executive culpability in favor of a few "rotten apples," or largely
denies wrongdoing altogether and claims that settlement is simply
to avoid the costs and burdens of further litigation.
Further leverage here could come from the SEC. One of the
factors on its list of whether to penalize a company is the extent of
its "remediation" efforts,132 a vague term that encompasses many
possible board responses to what has been uncovered. The SEC
could require a commitment from the company that it will seek
appropriate restitution from all identifiable wrongdoers and "defer"
enforcement action against the company pending its effort to do so.
The board would report periodically to the SEC on its progress and
receive approval with respect to the settlement or termination of
any action against the executives in question. This requirement
would also conserve SEC resources, addressing another factor that
sometimes leads to a preference for entity, rather than individual,
liability.

c.

Derivative Suits
As just noted, state law holds some promise as a source of
restitutionary recovery against executives. 133 Because of the dearth

131. See Coffee, supra note 2, at 1577 (citing In re Warner Commc'ns Sec.
Litig., 798 F.2d 35, 38 (2d Cir. 1986) (questioning settlements that leave out
individual defendant liability». I will leave to the side the question of whether
outside directors should bear greater personal liability for failures of oversight.
To date, the risk of outside director liability-putting aside the context of a
public offering of securities-is almost nil. See Black et aI., supra note 110, at
1062.
132. See supra note 122 and accompanying text. On remediation in SEC
settlements, see generally Cristie Ford, Toward a New Model for Securities
Enforcement, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 757, 785 (2005) (suggesting that negotiated
compliance and monitoring efforts will produce more law-abiding behavior).
133. Booth's suggestion is to concentrate on the derivative action as the
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of case law, however, the law is less clear than it might be about the
liability of executives who are somehow complicit in financial
misreporting.
One can glean from HealthSouth a basis for
rescission and restitution of incentive compensation contracts, albeit
with interesting open questions remaining about contractual
limitations on such remedies. It would be helpful to have guidance
on the validity of clauses that seek to protect compensation
notwithstanding breach of fiduciary duty. If the law was clearer,
director accountability would be enhanced as well because directors
making "business judgment" decisions on how to proceed would then
be expected to address the restitutionary option in justifying their
actions.
Indeed, Delaware law could benefit from more clarity on a
number of issues relating to executive responsibility with respect to
financial reporting. Malone v. Brincat stands for the proposition
that officers and directors are responsible for candid disclosure to
shareholders, whether or not shareholder action is sought. 134
However, purportedly so as not to conflict with the federal law that
fills the field, this duty of candor is limited in cases that do not
involve
requests
for
shareholder action to intentional
misrepresentation or nondisclosure where there is a duty to speak
and requires a showing of individualized reliance (i.e., not a fraudon-the-market-type presumption),135 making these cases unsuited for
class action treatment. In a case decided shortly after HealthSouth,
Vice Chancellor Strine indicated that equitable doctrines, such as
constructive fraud, should not be expanded in ways that would
undercut the Malone limitations, and he resisted treating
HealthSouth as an invitation for no-fault or negligence liability
under the duty of candor. 136
That point is well taken, though the concern is probably
overstated. The duty of candor issue in the absence of shareholder
action does overlap with a well-developed (and now more tightly
controlled) class action regime under federal law, which is about the
recovery of damages by open-market traders. The issue I have been
stressing is the executive's obligation of candor to the corporation,
which is most clearly embodied in an affirmative duty of candor visa-vis the company's board of directors and remediable via an action
by or derivatively in the name of the corporation. This is clearly a
state law issue, though again it is surprising that one finds so little
Delaware law dealing with "candor inside the corporation.,,137 More
mechanism for sanctioning corporate executives. See Booth, supra note 8, at
22-25.
134. 722 A.2d 5, 12-13 (Del. 1998).
135. Id. at II.
136. See Metro Commc'n Corp. BVI v. Advanced Mobilecom Techs. Inc., 854
A.2d 121, 163 n.102 (Del. Ch. 2004). For further discussion of Metro
Communication, see supra note 77 and accompanying text.
137. See Langevoort, supra note 20, at 1198-99.
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importantly, claims of unjust enrichment brought by, or on behalf of,
the corporation are of the sort where neither fault nor reliance have
13B
ever been required elements.
A flourishing body of law on
recouping incentive compensation would not, therefore, contravene
any significant Malone-type policies, regardless of whether one
treats the issue as fraud on the board or fraud on the shareholders.
Quite to the contrary, it would reinforce the body of law implicit in
Delaware jurisprudence that contracts tainted in their making or
performance by breach of fiduciary duty are voidable.
Indeed, there is probably room in Delaware law for greater
recognition of the distinction between claims for equitable relief and
claims for damages in terms of liability standards generally.
Consider the recent Disney litigation. 139 Insofar as that case was an
effort to impose damage liability on Disney's directors for their
supposed bad faith in the process by which Michael Ovitz's contract
was negotiated or terminated, plaintiffs properly faced a difficult
burden, which they failed to satisfy.140 But suppose the case was
restyled so that it was simply an effort to rescind Ovitz's contract or
cancel the termination and recoup the severance. Here, bad faith
would become unimportant-the plaintiffs only used that label in an
effort to avoid the exculpation provision in Disney's charter.
Delaware's exculpation authority only goes to claims for damages
against directors and specifically excludes cases of improper
personal benefit. It seems likely that a third party could not enforce
a contract with the corporation which he knew was made in breach
14l
of fiduciary duty by the company's directors. Arguably, that would
include awareness of gross negligence on the part of the directors or
circumstances where the third party knew that material
information had wrongfully been concealed from the board. As a
matter of simple equity, rescission could be warranted-albeit with
a countervailing quantum meruit claim for fair value of servicesupon any factual showing that would defeat the apparent authority
of those who negotiated the contract to act on the company's behalf.
My point here is not to say that Disney would or should have
come out differently (in the end, there was no finding of gross
negligence), but simply to show that if it were pursued as a
rescission and restitution case, rather than one against the directors
for damages, it would look somewhat different. This is a fruitful
area for further Delaware litigation.
138. See generally In re HealthSouth S'holders Litig., 845 A.2d 1096, 1105
(Del. Ch. 2003) (indicating the elements of an unjust enrichment claim).
139. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693 (Del. Ch. 2005),
affd, 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006) (holding that the board of directors did not breach
a duty of good faith by hiring and shortly thereafter terminating an employee
with a generous termination package).
140. Id. at 772.
141. See In re Paramount Commc'ns Inc. S'holders Litig., 637 A.2d 34, 50-51
(Del. 1994).
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TheSEC
The SEC has clear-cut authority to seek both restitution and
civil penalties against wrongdoing executives, plus forward-looking
relief in the form of injunctions, cease and desist orders, and
officer/director bars. 142
The question here is simply one of
probability of detection and institutional will, which in turn is
driven by the Commission's limited resources coupled with some
degree of litigation risk-aversion.
There would be some benefit from a clearer articulation of SEC
policy on individual responsibility in cases of financial misconduct.
Of particular interest here would be a statement of when and how
Section 304 of Sarbanes-Oxley143-requiring repayment of incentive
compensation and insider trading profits by CEOs and CFOs when
there has been an accounting restatement based on "misconduct"will be enforced. Courts have largely said that there is no implied
private right of action. l44 If this is so, then external enforcement
responsibility (coupled with exemptive authority) is given solely to
the Commission. It would help to have a strong message about the
facts and circumstances that make it appropriate or not to have
such payments and the expectations as to the board's role in
demanding disgorgement. As noted earlier, this can be done as part
of an enforcement action wherein the Commiss~on chooses not to
penalize the company so long as it commits to seeking restitution
from all complicit insiders. Because the natural form of resistance
on the part of company managers will be to resist restatements (or
at least restatements that might be characterized as involving
misconduct), the Commission should also look to bring cases against
both managers and auditors where companies apparently avoided
restating in order not to trigger Section 304.
V. CONCLUSION
Corporate managers have much to fear if they are complicit in
accounting fraud even under the system as currently structured,
where enterprise liability crowds out adequate attention to
individual liability. Many lose their jobs and their reputations, face
the risk of criminal prosecution, and, perhaps, share with other
investors the loss in the value of their company's stock and options
that comes when the fraud is uncovered. That executives continue
to partake in fraud notwithstanding this threat is either because of
142. Thomas C. Newkirk, Assoc. Dir., & Ira L. Brandriss, Staff Attorney,
Sec. and Exch. Comm'n, The Advantages of a Dual System: Parallel Streams of
Civil and Criminal Enforcement of the U.S. Securities Laws (Sept. 19, 1998),
http://www.sec.gov/news/speechlspeecharchive/1998/spch222.htm.
143. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, §304, 116 Stat. 745,
778 (2003) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 7243 (2005)).
144. In re Bisys Group Inc. Derivative Action, 396 F. Supp. 2d 463, 464
(S.D.N.Y. 2005); Neer v. Pelino, 389 F. Supp. 2d 648,657 (E.D. Pa. 2005).
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the extraordinary gains that come from pulling off a deception or the
ability of the human mind-and organizational culture-to blind a
person to palpable risks. It is probably a bit of both. Either way, we
should be cautious about assuming that tweaking the individual
liability system will necessarily produce better deterrence.
That said, it still strikes me as something of a baseline for the
legitimacy of our corporate law system that remedies not leave
executives who either instigated, helped execute, acquiesced in, or
closed their eyes to fraud with most or all the wealth that was
generated by the deception. It is all the worse ii we have created a
system of liability that garners support only because of the illusion
that it deters wrongdoing, but in fact mainly just moves money from
the pockets of some investors to those of others, at substantial cost.
The latter should be reformed in any event, but it would be a
shame if the relatively small amount of deterrence and
compensation offered by the current litigation regime were to be
eliminated without careful attention to the problem of individual
executive responsibility. We should admit, of course-as Vik
Khanna has argued in the criminal contexe45-that as a matter of
politics, the current emphasis on enterprise liability might exist
precisely because. it provides cover for the protection of executive
wealth. If so, it is naIve to expect that the system will change easily.
At least, however, we should remove the cover and see what
happens.

145. See generally Vikramaditya Khanna, Corporate Crime Legislation: A
Political Economy Analysis, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 95, 140 (2004).
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